Casinos Casino surveillance and how they detect you

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This is probably the most important information to read. Straight out of an industry text book.

industry line of defense

As we near the end of our study, we’ve covered an enormous variety of scams and strategies. It’s time to look at the many elements that comprise the detection process, but, first, let's overview the industry's line of defense.

Dealers

The dealer can be considered our first line of defense. Whereas a boss is responsible for many games, the dealer is a dedicated observer, only responsible for his game and the players on his game. Although very few|understand the mechanics of scamming, card counting, or advantage play in a meaningful way, they can occasionally spot an unusual or [suspicious action, then pass the information along to their supervisors. As a general rule, they do not contribute significantly to the detection of cheaters and skilled players, but they can initiate the process.

It's the consensus of many veteran gamers that the art of dealing has become a dying art. There was a time when the professional clerk' (a topnotch dealer) was respected, sought after, and was always guaranteed a job. Not any more. Most clubs shy away from experienced help; Binion’s Horseshoe used to be an exception, as there were always jobs for the best dealers. Its a sad truth, but today, when it comes to the dealer, mediocrity is the norm, and there are many reasons for this decline.

When the gaming business exploded throughout the country, the demand for dealers was huge, and inevitably, dealers were mass-produced, creatingfa weak and inexperienced work force. Conditions worsened when inexperienced dealers were quickly promoted to the floor, as the demand for floor supervisors was huge, too. This series of events . resulted in one soft spot after another for the skilled cheater or player, as they often targetted the weaker help. Las Vegas may have had an advantage in this regard because, with its break-in houses, dealers had places to learn their craft before dealing in the better clubs with bigger limits. Some jurisdictions, however, are not set up this way.

Cheaters and players are also known to target the experienced help. Talk with the professional advantage player, for example, and you will find that the veteran dealer is exploited just as much as the less experienced help; in fact, the veteran dealer is often targetted because of his experience. His loopholes and habits are more ingrained, they are more reliable, more predictable.

Once dealers have been in the business for a few years, they reach a point where they think that they have mastered their trade, and as they say, "It can be tough to teach an old dog new tricks." i Dealers are not subject to technical reviews once they advance past the break-in period, and just because a dealer has been dealing for ten years doesn't mean that he's immune from improvement, j I’ve personally talked with many seasoned floor supervisors who have, at times, made a genuine effort to step in and critique a dealer's skills, only to have the dealer respond with,'Tve been doing this a long time,” implying that he didn’t need the help. More than one dealer has interpreted constructive criticism as akin to harassment. And, it’s well known that in some dubs, bosses are patendy instructed to leave the dealers alone. When a boss can't demand that the dealer adhere to certain fundamentals and expea full support from his superiors, why would any boss make the effort to help?

Incentive is another issue contributing to weaker help. If a blackjack dealer makes the same money whether he learns to deal roulette or not, where's the incentive? If a blackjack dealer makes the same money whether he learns to deal the pitch game or not, where’s the incentive? In many clubs, mediocrity is tolerated, and outside of self-pride and self-respect, there are no incentives for dealers to excel. The irony is that, today, the dealer's job is more secure than ever, and it’s hard to get fired, due in a large part to Human Resources.

So, when one considers the relative inexperience of our work force, lack of technical review, and lack of incentive, it should come as no surprise that cheaters will always have soft spots to play, and advantage players will always have loopholes to exploit.

If you want your dealers to stand out, they must have a clear understanding of what is expected of them. The only way to accomplish these goals is with some form of ah ongoing evaluation or review program. When the dealers are periodically reviewed for how they shuffle, how they presend

 

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the deck for the cut, how they pitch, how they protect the holecard, how they protect the top card, the basic goals of game pace, their understanding of all in-house procedures, their attitudes, and for their professionalism in regard to treating all kinds of players in all kinds of situations, competence levels can only improve. Significantly!

Floor Personnel

In the 1960s and earlier, the average age of the doorman was around 60! There were no young people on the floor. Obviously the times have changed and this is okay. But, we still have no standards by which dealers can be promoted to the floor, no logical or just process that leads to promotion. The dealer is taught to deal in record time and promoted just as fast. When compared to other industries, where advancement generally requires special testing or training, certification, years of education, or a degree, the gaming business remains foreign in this respect. The old adage, "Its not what you know, its who you know,” still rules.

From a game protection standpoint, working the floor can be an uphill battle. Have you ever wondered how any floor person can watch four to eight games, perhaps fifty to sixty players, while at the same time -attending to his many other duties, including customer relations, ratings, and markers? Have you ever thought about how often the floor person has his back to a game, or how difficult it is to focus on one game without being blind to others? When you objectively look at the realities of the floor person, an obvious question arises,"How much of a role do they reallly play in the game protection process?"

Throughout my career, I have had floor people come up to me and say, Tve been in this business for ten years and I have never caught any scams.” This is no surprise and no fault of their own. First, scamming is rare, and second, if it ever did occur in their pit, it probably wasn't taking place while they were watching.

As it turns out, despite these issues, the floor person does play a very imporant role. Just having floor personnel in the pit creates a very important supervisory presente. Even though they don't have eyes in the back of their heads, they can still be an asset in respect to protecting the games. The better floor supervisors are acutely aware of their surroundings, and they have the ability to process both what they see and what they don't see. Although it may be rare for a supervisor to nail a cheater in the act, it's not uncommon for the floor person to sense a problem. When this occurs, he can notify his superior or call surveillance for assistance. His role is one of information gatherer and he, like the dealer, often becomes the initiator in the detection and evaluation process.

Casino Managers

Perhaps the most commonly asked game protection question by casino exectutives is,"What's the best thing I can do to protect my games?’ Start by hiring knowledgeable people, start by hiring a knowledgeable casino manager.

When the casino manager is truly a professional, has knowledge in all facets of operations, is fair to all employees, and is respected by all employees, only then will his operational philosophies trickle down to the shift managers, pit managers, and floor supervisors, and even surveillance. Only then will his staff be motivated to do the best job possible.

When the manager is a knowledgeable game protection proponent and instills balanced game protection guidelines, his staff will follow suit and watch the games, not sweat them; evauate the player in a timely and scientific manner, avoiding knee-jerk reactions; and treat the customer with more respect and less suspicion, including the winnners, unless its truly called for.

I remember one story about a casino manager in a weekly meeting with his shift managers,; writing on a chalk board, “WIN!” He was like a football coach at half time. Naturally, with this mindset, the club ended up with a bunch of'bleeders' (sweaters). In another club, the hotel manager was moved over to run the casino. He was a nice guy, people were treated fairly, and the working conditions were great, but the club never won ten cents. Everything was too lax, there was no control. ] Real knowledge, real people skills, and balance are the keys.

Surveillance

When scamming was suspected in the early days, the only option the boss had was to never take his j eyes off the game, an impossibility as he was responsible for supervising multiple games. Any dealer 1 or cheater 'doing business' would simply wait for the supervisor to be looking the other way, and, bingo, it was too late.

The first response was to hire 'spotters'. These were often ex-cheats who would walk the outside J Once a spotter was identified, however, the game was, once again, wide open. It quickly became! apparent that the best way to keep the cheaters guessing was to watch the game from above. An] eye-in-the-sky was the next step.

Small holes were drilled through the ceilings and spotters would climb through the ceiling rafters to observe the pit activity. Catwalks and one-way mirrors came next, and binoculars were often! helpful for a closeup view. A great story is told in Always Bet on the Butcher (Warren Nelson, 1994). Warren Nelson was working for Bill Harrah in 1946, in Harrahs Club in Reno. He happened to overhear some employees discussing a cooler that was to take place on a faro game, and the cheaters: were planning to switch the entire dealing box with cards. Nelson and Harrah crawled up into the attic to observe the scam through an air conditioning louvre. After the scam got nailed, Harrah was: quoted as saying, “Too bad we don’t have these on every game...” |

Shordy thereafter, Bill Harrah remodeled the attic area above the table games and put in several: one-way mirrors, and had one of the first peeks' (surveillance rooms) in the state of Nevada. Harolds

 

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Club was the first casino to develop a system of mirrored catwalks, which gave an unobstructed view of the entire casino floor.

The precamera surveillance room was a big step in the right direction, with one glaring drawback; even when a scam was detected by the eye-in-the-sky, there was no hard proof. It was the sky's word gainst the cheater.

The emergence of closed circuit television (CCTV) with video recording capability changed everything, and provided the impetus for the modern surveillance room. Equipment was inadequate at first. Limited coverage, tube cameras, and lighting issues all contributed to poor picture quality. So poor, in fact, that many judges would dismiss cases upon first review of the surveillance footage, even when cheaters were caught on tape.

Once the technology improved, the next step was to increase the coverage, eventually recording all games twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, and in many jurisdictions this is now mandated by law. Many also require a catwalk in addition to the surveillance sytem. The nucleus of most systems is a fixed camera on each table game, numerous PTZ cameras (pan, tilt, and zoom) positioned to include different viewing angles, and sophisticated, high speed switchers that allow surveillance to quickly switch from camera to camera, and instantly put numerous cameras on the same game.

Another major development occurred in the late 1970s. The industry decided that surveillance should no longer fall under the auspices of the casino manager, it would now be an independent department answering directly to the general manager, president, or owners (a growing trend in Indian gaming is for the tribal gaming commission to independendy staff and operate the surveillance department). It was a logical development as surveillance became responsible for observing so much more than just pit activity. It also addressed a built-in bias, since all surveillance reports had to get throughfoperations before getting to the owners. Lastly, it was deemed the best way to handle the possibility of collusion between the pit and the sky, a potentially devastating partnership.

¥ When the pit and surveillance started answering to different department heads, the working environment changed, and this would occasionally make for a challenging relationship. I've heard the frustration expressed many times, from both sides. After a phone call from the sky pointing out that a certain boss wasn't watching his game, the pit started complaining, "Who are they watching, the players or us?" Or, the frustration can also be felt after surveillance pegs a player to be a threat, only to be overruled by the pit. The desire to work hand-in-hand continues to be a challenge,

; Responsibility can vary from club to club. Some surveillance departments are a.gestapo with the last word on who stays and who plays. For many others, they just concentrate on collecting the data (footage) for the pit, who makes the final decision. There are many clubs where the suspicion/evaluation process starts with the floor, who notifies the pit/shift manager, who then notifies the sky. Here, the surveillance room is primarily a reactionary department, waiting for the pit to direct their efforts.

The buzzword in surveillance today is digital, with some of the biggest clubs in the world converting to complete digital systems. No more videotapes as the footage is recorded to hard drives, no more storagespace issues as the footage can be stored indefinitely, and thousands of hours of recorded footage cans be indexed and accessed quickly through digital libraries. Due to costs, these systems currently exist ! in only a small percentage of casinos, but it's just a matter of time before the entire industry is on the 1 same digital page.

Capability

There has always been a mystique about surveillance. How extensive is the coverage? How much do 1 they really see? How much protection do they really provided What are their true capabilities?

Over the last few years, a number of television show's have featured rare, behind the scenes! glimpses into the surveillance world. For most pit personnel, this is the only time they have ever been | exposed to the inner workings of this department. The image presented is undeniable; the surveillance! room is an in impenetrable fortress that sees everything! Does this aura of invincibility accurately portray ! the realities? Lets play the devils advocate.

First, not all surveillance systems are state-of-the-art,fjnot even in some of the largest casinos! in the world. Budgets don’t always allow the best, and even when they do, systems can be designed ] poorly. There are plenty of surveillance rooms all over the world where the picture, lighting, and angles are not always perfect. Even with high quality color systems available, many casinos still rely] on black and white coverage for better resolution. And, when you consider the fight over floor space] between the games manager and slot manager, it can be difficult to maintain optimal camera placement! when the floor plan is always in a state of flux.

Second, the camera lens doesn’t always provide a complete picture. Perception of depth can present problems in the most fundamental areas, such as reading bet size, which is obviously a crucial] factor. There is a lack of intimacy when surveillance is not privy to the comments and interaction of fl the players, dealers, and supervisors., It’s easy to miss important telltale clues. For example, is heat from the pit the motive behind an unusual play? As often occurs, one play can make all the difference in the world during an evaluation, but it can be difficult to catch a crucial reactionary play when it’s ■ outside the cameras view.

Third, with hundreds of cameras and few operators, surveillance doesn't always provide as many! additional sets of eyes to watch the games as commonly believed. Although an operator can casually! observe more than one game at a time with many monitors and Split screens, watching the player is only one of his duties. The surveillance department also watches the cage, count room, hotel elevators, the perimeter of the property, and many other areas of the operation. They can be busy with administrative dnrW (reports, reports, and more reports). They may be conducting employee evaluations or game pace audits. They may be dealing with technical issues (equipment checks, changing tapes, and such)| They may be reviewing in-house documentation regarding high rollers and credit activity. They may; be checking alerts and flyers from outside agencies. They may be handling disputes. And, they may be

 

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directing all of their efforts on one suspicious player, while hundreds of other players get a momentary fitepass.

Multimillion-dollar lawsuits from patrons claiming that they slipped by the pool, fell down the escalator, choked on food in the restaurant, or were hit by a car in valet parking, can result in cosdy litigations. In one case, a suit was filed by a man claiming to have been beaten up and robbed in the elevator. Sure enough, surveillance footage depicted the brutal assault. Later, it was discovered that the incident was staged. The liability from nongaming related lawsuits can far exceed the threat of some card bender or dice scooter trying to win 'short money (small score). As a result, a big part of the surveillance room’s responsibility has nothing to do with the pit. Today, many casinos now pass the responsibility of the nongaming coverage to security, so surveillance can concentrate more on gaming.

SE?Jlrth' even when surveillance directs its attention onto a genuine threat, what if the operator is knowledgeable, but the player or cheater is even sharper?

I don't have confirmation of the following, but it's believed that the majority of people working in the sky have never worked in the pit. Many gamers have questioned the effectiveness of a surveillance foperator watching a jam-up crap game, for example, if he has never dealt the game. Or, for instance, take the evaluation of an expert card counter. How do five cameras on the game and the capability to review the play assist an operator not qualified to watch this level of skill in the first place? I know that the same argument can be made of many working in the pit, and although I don't believe there is any substitute for live pit experience, I’ve met many surveillance operators who, without prior pit experience, have learned the games, inside and out. They are capable and proficient in their capacity.

Fifth, in some jurisdictions, the surveillance operator and/or director, may be the lowest paid employee with game protection responsibilities. This can make it difficult for the department to hold onto good help, or interest anyone in pursuing a career in surveillance as many leave to deal or work the floor.

Sixth, when faced with suspect play, in many dubs the final say is left to the surveillance director who will review the footage at a later time. What if he suspects a card bending play, but the cards are long gone? What if the play warranted different viewing; angles, but it’s too late? What if the play demanded a walk down into the pit to get a better look, but the players are history? This is an important process, but after the fact analysis is often too little, too late.

Seventh, most cheaters and players are detected solely from being identified or associated with a prior scam or play and not from being caught in the act. Identification alone plays a major role in the detection process. This is not to take anything away from surveillance, but is only mentioned to help put the departments capabilities into perspective. It takes very little knowledge to detect scams based on the identification of players.

The physical realities of surveillance are no secret to experienced gamers. They are not foolproof, they are not impenetrable, but they are, however, far reaching and ubiquitous. In Technology Review (April, 2003), in an article by Dan Farmer and Charles Mann called "Surveillance Nation”, they stated:

».. were creating a world in which our every movement, transaction, and indiscretion can he electronically tracked... the new marriage of ever smaller lenses and sensors, very large databases, and ever faster computers, is making surveillance so cheap and commonplace that it is on the way to creating a state of nearly universal surveillance... ultimately, unmonitored public space will effectively cease to exist.

 

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This is very true in the gaming business, as the sky is watching everything, but watching the games in real-time and watching the games electronically are two completely different processes. Watching everything doesn't mean catching everything.

Cheaters vs Surveillance

Cheaters were once adept at manipulating the limited surveillance coverage before the 24/7 era. Not any more. The 24/7 coverage stopped many of them dead in their tracks, and most of the husders agree. They'll tell you, “The cameras put us out of business." But this is not to say that the cameras put all husders out of business, and it's naive to think otherwise.

Some scams, like the old-fashioned cooler, disappeared for obvious reasons. No matter how fast the switch occurred, no one can fool a frame-by-frame replay. Other scams, like mucking and switching, virtually disappeared, as even when the mucker was a pro, his actions were relatively easy to detect by a knowlegeable operator. Scams like card bending, playing paint, peek and flash scams, the slug scam, and many other dealer/agent scams, however, didn't just fall off the map. Historically, surveillance was never much of a deterrent to these scams anyway. When was the last time sophisticated card benders, or slug scams, or peek/flash scams have been caught on tape? Not often, and prosecuted even less.

There is less cheating today than ever, and the primary reason for this is better surveillance and more of it. The cheating that does exist, however, is more sophisticated out of necessity. The better the surveillance, the better and more sophisticated the scams and strategies.

I know of one crew that specializes in a card marking scheme. First, they case the pit, looking for action, and there must be premium play. If there's a lot of low end black check play, they'll bet green, and if there's plenty of $500 check action, they'll bet black.

Next they splash. The takeoff man plays for fifteen minutes betting $200 a hand on a crowded game, never heads-up. If surveillance happens to evaluate his play, they won't see a thing, just a weak basic strategy player who always seems to parlay his money when the count is bad (these cheaters learned to count cards because they believed that the first thing most surveillance operators look for is the card counter). So, the takeoff man bounces around, eventually getting to the target game where the cards are marked. He plays for thirty to sixty minutes, tops. If his play was evaluated initially and there was nothing to alert surveillance, there is little time to recognize the change in strategy (from his cover play to scamming). Now the crew piggybacks the first hours play with a different takeoff man and a different look, with a new takeoff man betting less and playing two hands in uneven, oddball amounts. On a recent trip, this four-man Crew won in excess of $30,OCX). They played in every top joint, and never raised an eyebrow, and this was their third Las Vegas trip in eight months.

Take the case of two dealers working the slug scam every week for over a year. They played undetected against a competent staff and excellent surveillance. The takeoff players always changed, and lack of greed and big scores enabled the crew to beat this club for a long time. The club eventually went to all shoe games, forcing the crew to lay low. Recently, the single-deck games have been reintroduced with the 6 to 5 blackjack payoff. Guess who’s back in action?

The best cheaters understand up front that, at a minimum, an overhead fixed camera is watching their every move. This is okay with them. They go with scams that can be difficult to detect from a single overhead camera. They fully realize that surveillance has the capability to watch their play with many different cameras, all from different angles, thus eliminating the shortcomings of a single overhead view, but this degree of coverage, as a general rule, only comes after a strong suspicion of foul play. This is why the better cheaters and players prefer a hit and run approach, bouncing from club to dub, jurisdiction to jurisdiction.

Numerous other cases could be cited where cheaters, card counters, and advantage players have played undetected over long periods in some of the biggest clubs in the world against the best equipment and technology. If cheaters move in and out of a property quickly, and avoid the heat from big money scams, there is still an excellent chance of avoiding detection despite the advances in technology and 24/7 coverage.

Real Benefits

Outside of the obvious advantages of reviewing suspect play, the biggest benefit of surveillance is the deterrent factor. This alone will keep the majority of the players and employees honest, and keep many cheaters guessing.

Technological advances in the surveillance room have literally changed the face of game protection, but not always in positive ways. I recently talked with a casino manager who told me, “I just let my surveillance room evaluate the players My bosses can be deaf, dumb, and blind, so long as they’re friendly." This is a dangerous doctrine. These comments obviously came from someone who has never worked in surveillance, nor has ever talked with his surveillance staff to fully understand their strengths and weaknesses. Surveillance is an invaluable asset, but it should never be used as a crutch.

Only when surveillance complements the floor evaluation, and vice versa, can you end up with the maximum protection. It takes the best of two worlds. The pit and surveillance provide two completely different perspectives, and not benefitting from both doesn’t make sense. The best systems are those where the pit, management, and surveillance all have some input in the evaluation of suspicious play.

 

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Of course, only one person will have the ultimate decision, but if I'm that person, I want as much information as possible.

Software Detection

Surveillance has many obvious advantages over the pit supervisor when it comes to evaluating suspect play. Where a supervisor may miss an entire round or two, surveillance has the ability to play back and review, take notes, take their time, dissect a play and may even benefit from some very sophisticated detection/analysis software.

The software designed today is primarily used in the detection of card counters. These programs will detect most players given the time, but the playing session must be reasonably large. Some vendors claim that one hour is all that is needed to detect skilled play. I believe these claims to be overly optimistic. What happens when the game stays reasonably neutral over an hours time, and a top player looks more like a basic strategy player than a counter? What happens if a player plays a losing game for the first few hours with the hopes that the software will peg him as a nonthreat, long before he starts to play his best game? What happens when more than one suspect counter is playing at the same time?

Sometimes, these programs only tell part of the story. For example, the software may indicate a series of max bets in a rich deck, but what you don't know is that the player won five hands in a row, parlayed twice, and stayed with the bigger bet size until he lost a couple of hands. This could easily be the actions of the typical tourist. Unfortunately, if this happens once, the player may be labeled a card counter. Aggressive cover strategies may also weaken the analysis.

Even with the help of modem technology, these programs aren't foolproof. They have value, but only when used under ideal conditions. Since most top players are hip to these programs, don't expect the best players to make it easy and provide you with these conditions.

There may also be an interpretation issue. These programs tend to provide so much summary data that it can be difficult to see through the clutter, and putting so much data into a coherent summary can be tricky, especially over short time periods. Here are a few sample summary conclusions after 100 hands:

♦ The player’s betting pattern matches that of a card counter and yields 0.6% over fiat betting.

- The players decision strategy is worse than basic strategy by 0.8%.

• The casinos advantage against the player is 0.3%.

* 50% of the player’s decision errors are correct would the player have known the dealer’s holecard.

* 30% of the player’s decision errors are correct would the player have known the top card.

* On average the player won hands he should have lost.

I There is a l-in-25 chance that the casino loses as much as it did.

These conclusions were taken from summary sheets generated by the Blackjack Survey Voice System (now called Bloodhound), arguably the best of the detection products and currently linked to many casinos. Okay, put it all together; do you back the player off? In my view, if you can accurately and objectively combine and interpret all of the summary data, you're probably qualified to make an evaluation without the software.

I believe these products can do a good job, provided (1) surveillance can find the time to use the product, (2) conclusions are drawn from a much larger sample than is currently recommended, and (3) conclusions are made from someone with a thorough understanding of exacdy what the summary data mean in the context of a complete and fair evaluation. You must realize that these products are forced to be somewhat ambiguous. They cannot come out and say, "Back the player off" One mistake and their product would be in jeopardy. They can, however, generate tons of data and safely leave the interpretation up to the client. What you will never find with these products is the cost of misdiagnosing the play or misinterpreting the data and backing off the wrong player.

Outside Agencies

Griffin Investigations, and many similar agencies (like ICSN, CVI, and others) surfacing in recent years, can play a major role in the evaluation/detection process. These agencies collect information on cheaters, advantage players, and card counters, which is then sold to the casinos. In many clubs, this information is the sole and deciding factor leading to the player getting backed off. There's often no evaluation process. "He's in the book," for example, is all it takes to be labeled as a threat..

Many of the largest, most reputable casinos in the world support these companies and use their products religiously. They see the obvious value from networking with other casinos via these services. Technological advances with their products have made it easier for gamers to search the databases and identify suspect players quickly. The trend is to integrate biometric-based technologies into their player recognition software, but, at this juncture, the jury is still out regarding reliability.

To most, these agencies are synonymous with a source for identifying cheaters, yet their databases are loaded with legitimate players. There's a definite reason for tatgetting this group, and that is that the times have changed. There aren't enough cheaters around anymore to make it interesting. If these agencies were to limit their services to just cheaters, their products would still have value, but their business would flounder.

Detractors of these services can come from both players and the industry. Players have long questioned the practices of these agencies. How can they take players, who have never been convicted of any crime, and distribute their photographs for profit without their consent? What about libel, lack of due process, or a number of other legal issues that arise when you throw legitimate players into

 

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the barrel with the cheaters? I’m not an attorney but what I can tell you, is that despite numerouS lawsuits over the years surrounding these issues, these agencies continue to flourish.

From an industry standpoint, hot all casinos Use these services/ and one has to wonder why* Some have questioned the accuracy of the information they sell, and others have issue with the lack! of support information. For example, has anyone ever requested, “The photograph and description arel fine, but is there any substance to go along with these accusations?” ’Are there ever any detailed reports® mathematical proof, demonstrations?"

There are even concerns regarding confidentiality issues. It is generally known that the best® players have access to the book and to the flyers. They know who’s in-the database. Through industrjn friends and contacts, they have access to the information on a daily basis, and they're not paying fora it. They know when its time to lay low, change their look, or frame their play differently, and some® believe this weakens their product.

Over the years, I've met a few of the agents, mostly good guys just trying to make a living. What 1 struck me most was their adeptness at remembering faces, the ’book’ was their bible. When new players® come on the scene, who weren't in the book or database, these agencies prove to be a weak source for | evaluating suspect play. This may be one of the reasons that the teams get bigger and bigger in terms* of recruitments, they have to keep changing the faces. Even with biometric-based technologies, these® agencies must rely on the simple premise.that one must be caught first before a picture/information I can be sold to the casinos to aid them in the detection of the same player again. Casinos are on their® own for catching the bad guys first time around.

Another issue expressed by some operators is that they feel like they’re buying their own | information back. Since most photos originate in the surveillance room, and are given to Griffin and 1 similar agencies, then packaged (adding text, background information, associates, and such), and soldi back to the casinos, it may be a fair viewpoint.

In my view, hiring these agencies is not the problem, it’s all about utilizing the information they! sell in the most meaningful, productive way.

Whether you employ these agencies or not is, of course, your business. If you do, arguably, the! most practical way to benefit from these services is in the role of a support team Utilize their information in conjunction with your own in-house evaluation of suspect play, and not as the last word. Their service can be helpful, but, the bible, it's not. You don't want to be in a situation where your evaluation^ become a function of their quality of information. By the way, this is not a position that some of the : agencies contest. One company adds the following disclaimer with their alerts: -

Each property should make their own evaluations and establish probable cause for any impropriety.

 

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TABLE GAME PROCEDURES

After staff and surveillancer, the next tier of protection is the table game procedures. Simply stated, table game procedures are the best and most practical options for dealing the games. The primary goal of any table game procedure is control, because without procedures there would be chaos. When good, effective, efficient procedures are in place, the benefits derived are uniformity, consistency, and openness.

Uniformity gets everyone following the same plan so everyone knows what to expect. Anticipation is good, as there shouldn't be any surprises on a live casino table game. Furthermore, the public expects it, and they deserve it. The typical player bouncing from table to table trying to find Lady Luck doesn’t want to be bothered by the uneasiness of trying to interpret different dealers doing different things.

Once everyone is on the same page procedurally, consistency is the next goal. Procedures should be routinely enforced and stay rigid. Only under special circumstances, such as accommodating a high roller, should the occasional exception to the rule be permitted.

Procedures are not just for dealers. When they are open and easy to follow, they help the pit and surveillance do their jobs, and they create a comfort level for players, ensuring a safe and professional gaming experience.

Which Procedures are Best?

Not everyone agrees which table game procedures are best. Different management philosophies beget different priorities. Walk into some clubs and it's very clear that productivity is paramount, as the procedures are streamlined and efficient. In other clubs, game protection is obviously the focus as indicated by the thoroughness of their procedures and the implementation of numerous countermeasures.

In some cases, choosing the best procedure is a matter of personal preference and the decision nutters little at the end of the year. In blackjack, examples might include whether you pay blackjacks immediately or at the end of the round; how you handle ’money plays’; or where you position the dealers hand as the round is picked up (does it end up on the top or the bottom of the round?). Some decisions, however, carry much more impact, and the potential gains or losses can be enormous. Look at a six-deck shuffling procedure that takes almost three minutes. With equally safe shuffles that can be completed in half the time, how can the longer procedure be justified?

Not long ago, many clubs were dealing pick and pay’. This is the procedure where each player's cards must be picked up before the dealer can move to the next hand. The dealer ends up with the deck in one hand and discards in the other, yet is required to pay and take while both hands are dirty. When this procedure is compared to lay and pay’, where all cards remain on the layout until all bets are paid, it fails miserably. The pick and pay procedure is slower, sloppier, prone to disputes (the instant each hand is revealed, it's picked up almost immediately), more vulnerable to scams (such as pushing losers), and technically more difficult to deal.

This is an example where the choice is clear. The lay and pay procedure made the game easier

 

[cyph]

to deal and easier to supervise, and significandy so. The change helped sell the integrity of the game. I Supervisor Guidelines

Procedures also provide the perfect guideline for the overzealous dealer or supervisor, as they help | eliminate all of the guesswork.

For example, in some clubs the dealer has discretion regarding the shuffle. If the dealer is running bad, he can add extra riffles, strip thin, or round-robin the deck by dealing all the way to the last card. Some believe! that changing the shuffle could help get the game back on track. The same is true for ] roulette dealers who openly change rotor and ball speeds as if trying to control the spin; the stickman in craps setting the dice on certain lucky numbers ih an attempt to stop the player from winning; or ! a boss sneaking up behind the dealer and instructing him to shuffle up every time a $5 check player goes to $10^-these are all examples of unprofessional behavior.

When the games are dealt honesdy, dealers arid supervisors have no control over chance fluctuation, 1 and should never be given the opportunity to invoke their, expertise. They should focus on dealing, 5 supervising, protecting the game according to procedures, and letting the games run their course. Good, solid procedures make it easier for the dealer and; supervisor to do their jobs without sweating the results. That’s why top management is always easy to spot. You walk through the pit and everyone's : doing the same thing with the same smiles—win, lose or draw..

Protection against Cheating, Theft, and Skilled Players

Procedures also represent one of the most misunderstood aspects of game protection. The confusion-! begins when one believes that1 procedures are always the best defense against cheaters and scams.;? This is simply not true!

For example, no shuffling procedure exists that will eliminate the possibility of a false shuffle related scam; if a dealer is required to shuffle, then a false shuffle is always a possibility. There is no: procedure that will stop the best cheaters from past posting the wheel. Calling out ,“No more bets,” long before the ball lands, doesn’t stop past posters who fully intend to turn the dealer and bet after the ball lands anyway. And there is no procedure that will stop a box person from stealing. You may require that both hands stay out in front, no arms crossed, no reaching into pockets, and so on, but for those with the larceny to steal, procedures provide little protection; they’re just a few guidelines that must be followed while the theft Occurs.

% took at the traditional procedure of dealers clapping but, and showing .both hands empty: before leaving the game. What scam is prevented by following this procedure? The obvious answer.! is that it stops dealers from concealing stolen checks in their hands when leaving the game. But is this true? Sure, it stops dealers from blatantly hiding checks'intheirhands^When leaving the game,

 

[cyph]

but it;does riot stop them from leaving the game with stolen checks! The dealer could throw to his armpit/secrete a stolen check under the watchband, or steal with the use of a sub, and then cleanly show both hands empty before leaving the game, thus following all of the procedures to the letter.

In the best scams ij^rid strategies, a: deviation from procedure is not a requirement. For example, a dealer using the gap peek, can keep the deck level and open while flashing to an agent. A dealer looking into the wheel head for an extra half-second1 to allow his agent to past post the columns, violates no procedures. In respect to advantage play, many multideck shuffles are trackable only when dealers follow procedures.

In the spirit of fairness, good solid procedures will occasionally plug a leak and eliminate a loophole, such as a dealer riffling too high, or flashing the holecard during the deal. Also, it can be difficult for; some scams -to exist without a breach1 iri^'procedure, arid this may provide an important tell for bosses ariasurveillance operators.' But for the! overwhelming majority of scams and advantage strategies, there is no such thing as an impenetrable proceduT^aS:the best scams and,strategies have circumvented our procedures without breaking bur rules for decades.

Procedure Questions

Procedures have'^idways [fascinated me, in: particular/tne'^ arid the logic behind

these rules. Sometimes justification! for a pdticular proceduredefies explanation.

New Decks

Why is it that we wash new decks in our shoe games? Are we concerned about dealer/agent false shuffle scams? Wouldn't it be obvious if the cards hit the layout in AH, 2H/3H, 4H, 5H order? If a dealer has the ability to false shuffle, why would he fool with the "most obvious'slug imaginable?

Do we wash the cards prior to the shuffling procedure to provide a better mix than, for example, simply extending the normal shuffling procedure? If you compare any standard shuffling ; procedure with a wash to the same procedure:J\yith; two extra-riffles per packet, you cannot distinguish the mix. Moreover, the wash is not a terrific randomizer, and the more decks in play, the weaker the process.

Finally, we all know that our cards are often cut offcenter, so the back design doesn't run evenly off the edges. Both scams and advantage techniques have exploited this flaw. Maybe the real purpose of the wash is to mix up the cuts, more so than the cards? If this is the case, wouldn’t a simple half-turn for each deck following the shuffle do the trick? If these are the jissues driving the procedure, why don't we wash the cards in single- and double-deck games, where exploitation is more likely?

Washing the cards is obviously part of a procedural tradition, but for me, the process has always

 

[cyph]

struck me as an unprofessional way to mix the cards.

New Dealer - New Shuffle

You're dealing double-deck, and after pitching one hand the new dealer taps you on the shoulder, so .1 you hand him the remaining cards and the game continues. The new dealer may or may not burn a 1 card before dealing. Either way, there is no delay requiring a new shuffle from the new dealer. This 1 one-time popular procedure is rarely seen today. Why?

Apparently, some gamers find the procedure to be dangerous, yet there is nothing in the way 9 of scams or advantage play that could target this specific procedure that wouldn't beat the game 1 anyway. The game dealer claps out, the transfer is clean, open, and out in front of the chip rack. 1 It's clearly a more productive procedure, especially in the double-deck game. When a new dealer 1 comes to a shoe game, we don’t break the deck and shuffle, so why break and shuffle in the hand I held games?

Equipment Issues

Here are a few issues to think about in regard to the equipment we use.

Why would any club have their dealers preshuffle by hand before putting the cards in a shuffling machine? Either management trusts the integrity of the machine, or they don't. And if 1 it's an issue of public perception, why use the product in the first place? Doesn’t shuffling by hand followed by shuffling by machine negate the primary benefit of these devices: productivity?

Why is the overall back design on our playing cards still the favorite? The overall back blurs definition and adds to the deceptiveness of false shuffles, false deals, and many other cheater's moves. ] It has been the preferred card of cheaters for over a hundred years. A bordered card provides more clarity in regards to watching the shuffle, the deal, and the players’ hands. Why haven't more dubs looked at the white back? It's clearly a more difficult card to mark. Or use plastic cards? Poker dealers handle these cards experdy, so why not use plastic cards in our pit games, especially in single- and double-deck games where the players handle the cards?

Some clubs have opted for an acrylic dome on their roulette wheels to' stop any scam where the ball may be influenced from the outside by hidden wires, compressed air, or whatever. Is this truly an equipment decision consistent with risk? Apparently not, as the majority of clubs have passed on adding the domes, When one considers the rareness of these scams, and the fact that these domes can make it more difficult for the player to anticipate and confirm the winning number—thus making the game less enjoyable to play—you may have an example where the domes do their job in regard to security, but hurts the game overall. I’ve met more than a few players who wont play against them.

 

[cyph]

Table Rules

For table rules, a classic example is the ’ no-mid-shoe entry signs stopping any player from entering a blackjack game in progress; he can only play following a fresh shuffle. Imagine a player losing $10,000 on one game, he gets frustrated, jumps to the next game and makes a bet, only to have the dealer say,

"I’m sorry, sir, you'll have to wait until the shuffle up " This could take fifteen minutes! -*

This special rule'effectively stops back-counting, but do we really need a no-mid-shoe entry sign to stop this strategy, perhaps the most obvious, transparent card counting scheme of them all?

How many shoes can a player jump into without standing out like a sore thumb, especially with a decent bet size? r From a’ detection standpoint, it doesn’t get much easier. But more importantly, is the scenario any different than a player betting $5 a hand, and then suddenly jumping his bet size* to $200? If we cant]stop the seated players from dramatically increasing bet size, do we really gain that much from stopping back-counters? Do we really want to start telling gamblers how, when, and where they can make their next bet? Some operators saj^ yes, and contend that the legitimate players are not offended by the policy; they become conditioned, and finding a fresh shuffle is generally not a ‘ problem.

In' some Knobs, the floor personnel are’given the authority to override a mid]shoe entry. A well-known player, one who is losing significantly, the little old lady, and others, could all get passes. This tends to lessen the strictness of the rule, yet leaves; the door open for much interpretation and, therefore, lack offconsistency. Many clubs now adopt an unwritten no-mid-shoe entry policy?# for any unknownfplayer betting $500 bVmore, but many others believe thisyrule to be on the paranoidfside.

Floo0upervisors

Where is the gain from having our supervisors count the large and estimate the small, or count all of the drop, or having dealers conducting a clicker count? A long time ago, bosses wanted to know what the win was before they got the official count the next morning. Oldtimers have told me that the custom started with shift managers, following a hugely profitable shift, learning the next day that the figures indicated otherwise. There was a whole lot of skimming going on back then, so bosses started counting the drop to protect themselves. But those days are long gone.

Why go through this ritual when the count room is going to provide the exact result just -hours away? Any competent shift manager can look at his hit sheet, estimate the grind, and come up • with a best guess as to his shifts coutcome. When you see bosses counting twenty-dollar bills in five5 hundred million-dollar properties, there’s something cheap about it; something that says’ to players, “Were sweating every $20 bill." And perhaps they are! Only recently have some of the clubs stopped

 

[cyph]

counting the drop, and started to pull the boxes only once per day.

Lasdy, why don't we see more pit managers and shift managers walk the games from the outside? m I have only seen the practice adhered to in a few dubs. It's a terrific procedure. You would be surprised 1 at what you can see when you look at these games from the same side of the table as the players. It is ’1 unnerving to cheaters and skilled players, it gives the bosses a chance to say hello to the players, and it 1 adds an overall presence you don’t get from bosses leaning on the pit podium. In my opinion, it's one J of the most overlooked procedures for bosses in our industry.

When it comes to procedures, the list goes on and on, as there are many questions and very few compelling answers.

Resistance to Change

There is a conflict that exists in this industry that often hinders the dedsion mdong abih^ advancemient/i and creativity of potentially top casino executives, and this problem is best: illustrated by a'story;I was once ^ asked to examine a specific procedure for potential loopholes. I did, and rendered a reportofmy findings^ The casino manager knew in his heart that the procedure was exploitable; I only corroborated his feelings; | But he never made the appropriate changes After giving it some thought, hie decided that with his " salary, bonuses, and stock options, the best strategy for him was to keep the boat from rocking. He was just looking to survive in the corporate environment. As it turned out the procedure was exploitable, it got beat for a ton, and was eventually changed by the new management team. The last time I talked with the casino manager, he and his team had moved to a bigger club and were all promoted to very high corporate positions.

Evaluating Procedures

Before implementing a new procedure, there are many^questions to ask. Does it provide more security facilitate the dealers job, make the gameeasierfpr bosses andsuryeillanceto observe.or increase productivity? If the answer is yes to a specific security threat, are you sure that the procedure will stop it? Is there the possibility of creating a false sense of security? Is the procedure consistent, with risk? How does it look and play from the customers side of the table? Will ^epipbedure^^^het game down? If so, by how much, and at what cost?

If this sounds like a lot of questions to ask, lets look at the most basic of procedures: changing decks in the single-deck game. Some clubs change the decks every half-hour, others every hour, others every two hours or even longer depending on business. And some clubs, there are no guidelines, they only change the decks when a player is winning or he raises suspicion. There are many philosophies, and most are driven by game protection concerns.

 

[cyph]

Here are some considerations. First, it only takes a few shuffle ups for cheaters playing the bend or daub, to have playable information, as discussed in the marked cards section. Frequent deck changes are only a mild inconvenience to these cheaters, whether they are allowed to play undetected is all that really matters to them. So, changing the cards frequendy for protection can create a false sense of security. Second, at the end of the year, the card costs will be higher in clubs changing the decks frequendy than in those clubs changing the cards less frequendy, sometimes significantly so. Reselling the cancelled decks can mitigate these costs, although many clubs simply give their cancelled cards away. Third, look at the time it takes to introduce a new deck, open it on the game, and inspect the new cards. For a club changing the decks every half-hour,, an extra minute of down tirrie every hour adds up at the end of the year. Fourth, consider the psychological aspects of changing decks. How often does a deck change break up a game? How often does a deck change give the player a chance to say,“They're changing the cards, my luck is going to change, it's probably time to leave," (this is also true with making fills on crowded games). * Fifth, changing the deck ties up the floorperson, and all the other games in his section must go unsupervised momentarily during a deck change.1

Do these comments imply that if you change the decks every half-hour, you should expect a false sense of security, higher costs, a decrease in productivity, the wrong psychological message to players, and less supervision? Perhaps. Maybe changing the decks every half-hour is not such a good idea.

The point of this exercise is toshowthateven^iththemost basic of'all procedures^ a fair amount of thought and energy is required tprassess thepros and cons. If you ask many questions and can live with honest, objective answers based on a thdtQughKLn'alj^is, comparison to the alternatives, in-house testing, or historical results, then you arergomgJthrough a process that'is rarely; followed. In most casinos, there are two primary reasons |for adopting certain procedures: tradition; as its easy to take procedures for granted just because they've been around for years, and copying another club, often a bigger club, because one assumes that they must haye done their homework.',!

Pit Finesse

Finally, here are a few short stories that address the rigidness of many rules and procedures, and seem to indicate that there may be a time and place

A friend of mine works the floor in the. dice pit and goes to work at 6:00 pm;his club likes,to bump the minimums up from $5 to $10 at around 8:00 pm. One night, the game is loaded with diehard $5 check players, all betting a nickel on the pass line with single odds, making nickel come bets and place' bets. There are two quarter players. The dice havebeen passing and the rails are loaded with' nickels. At 8:00, the shift manager tells my friend to increase the minimums'. It’s pointed out that changing the game with these players might not be a good idea, but the shift'manager ignores the input, leans into the game, and says, “Okay, folks, on the next shooter the minimum .will be ten dolHrsFollowing the seven out, the players came in for color to the tune of around $5,000, and when the smoke cleared,

 

[cyph]

there were only two players left!

A player is betting $100 in two boxes on a $25 minimum game. Its graveyard, the business is 1 light, and the players action is soft. After losing a few hands, the player bets three hands at $100, and 5 the supervisor jumps in and instructs the player,“To play three hands at a hundred dollars, we require five times the table minimum." The player picks up his checks and leaves.

A high roller walks in and starts firing $1,000 and $2,000 a hand. He has a few friends with ; him and they're all taking up seats, but none are playing. The man quickly gets stuck about $20,000 1 when the shift manager instructs the floor boss that the players friends will have to stand back, and | ■leave the seats open for players. The player storms out of the club, walks across the street, and blows i $100,000.

About twenty-five years ago, I’m dealing one of the biggest crap games of my life—double ^ box, double floor, with about $100,000 on the layout, and the play is .evenly divided between right and wrong action. The point is ten and here comes a cocked die. The stickman looks to the base dealer : for help, but he freezes, leaving the die on edge for five seconds (a pro would knock the die off immediately ■ and make his best call). If the die falls one way ;its a winner ten, and the other way will result in a seven out. 'i The dealer eventually calls a seven out, and the players start screaming. The big boss is called to the game to help out with the riot. If you were that boss, what would youdo?'y

Most will tell you that you go with the dealer's best call and stand up for your help, as these things happen. But after the big boss looks around at the premium customers, he makes the ONLY decision he can—he pays both sides! The players start applauding and cheering, because the message ,is clear: We do everything we can to give all players a fair shake!JIf you were a high-end craps shooter, why would you want to play anywhere else? The decision may have cost a few dollars at that moment, but long term, there wasn't a player on that game who ended up.in the black at the end of the year from his craps play!

Although the importance of strict procedural control is noted, every once in a while, situations present themselves when a little flexibility may be in a property's best financial interest.

The logic and value of many of our procedures remain questionable, and it appears that many procedures could be improved with a little more thought, common sense, and simple, nontechnological alternatives. Just to be fair, technological solutions also have a place; after all, who can doubt the benefits and success of peeking devices and shuffling machines? But with technology, many other issues are beginning to surface. Are we overdependent on technology? Does technology .take the place of experienced personnel? How far will we go? One boss' perspective said it all;" The pit is beginning to look like one giant slot machine"

In the end, no one can dispute the importance of good, effective, consistent, table game procedures as they're vital to effective, efficient table game operations, and there was never an attempt to undermine their role. But once you understand their real purpose, their real value, what they,:accomplish and what they do not, table game procedures will take on a whole new

 

[cyph]

meaning, especially in respect to protecting the games.

DETECTION SKILLS

To have your best chance of detecting the cheater or skilled player, certain skills are needed, yet the first step in'the evaluation/detection process for most gamers is hard to label as a skill. I have asked hundreds of gamers the following question," What is the first thing you do to start the evaluation/detection process?’', and their response may surprise you. The majority’start with a gut instinct based on some stereotypical belief. Before they even begin to evaluate the play, they evaluate the player, and often make an immediate, initial assessment based on a players image, age, sex, ethnic background, and so on. Essentially, this all comes down to profiling.

Profiling

To have a gut instinct regarding suspect play is okay, stereotypes routinely enter our consciousness, but you must be prepared to follow up with a scientific evaluation and block out any preconceived notions you may have. The better cheaters and skilled players will go to great lengths to present the most believable nonthreatening image, so it can be difficult to judge a book by,its cover. ’

Lets take a few minutes tc/discuss some pfithejmqrejinteresting and common traits, attributes, ambiguities, and nuances of the cheater and skilled players;!'•

Age

You can’t match the ^^msiasm’offa young person.’ Many of the bestisleight-bf-hand artists are in their twenties and thirties. They will practice 24 hours a day, and are capable of amazing manipulative skill. Many of the best card counters and advantage players are young, and generally educated. This said, the biggest problem with young people is legitimacy. They don’t initially strike us as one who can afford to foolishly bet $2,000 a hand, so suspicion is automatic.:;Of course,1 the obvious way around the problem is with older takeoff men and BPs.ll

I have only come across a few successful young casino cheaters. They generally don’t have the know-how to apply their skill. One was playing in the clubs when he was eighteen (taught by his father whenffie was only fifteen).

On the other end of the spectrum you have the older folks. There are many oldtimers who have mastered the senior citizen profile to a T. They walk with a limp, and move in slow motion; You’d swear that a bit of dementia has set in. Its an act. They're sharp, experienced, and can possess unparalleled wisdom that allows them to not only win the money, but get away with it without anyone ever blinking an eye.

 

[dicesetter]

You can't always profile craps players. Even little old ladies are known to do well at dice setting

 

[steve]

Ah! The new popup was kind of sudden.

Maybe you are eventually going to post about it, but some casinos use various chip tracking technology to check for betting patterns. The method to avoid detection is of course going to vary between games.

There is plenty of potential for casinos to automatically detect advantage play with a high degree of certainty, but they havent evolved to this point yet.

 

[Bust]

Dicesetter I'll assume you really are getting an edge. Is there any collusion or gaffing? Or is it all in the throw?

 

[Loud American]

Just saying thanks cyph, great stuff

Even if I dont say much I eagerly wait more